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Abstract
This Note examines the interrelationship between the Convention and the FISA, specifically,
whether a sovereign’s ratification of the Convention constitutes a waiver of immunity under section
1605(a)(1) of the FISA in actions to enforce arbitration agreements and awards. The development
of sovereign immunity law in arbitration enforcement actions, pre-FISA and under the FISA’s
“waiver” exception, is reviewed in light of the Convention. The confusion over the Convention
as it affects sovereign immunity is discussed, and a resolution of the issue is proposed in favor of
barring the sovereign immunity defense in actions falling under the Convention.

THE VALIDITY OF THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY DEFENSE IN SUITS UNDER THE
CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL
AWARDS
INTRODUCTION
Commercial arbitration has become an indispensible method
of dispute resolution in the international business community.' It
provides an independent means of settling disputes while avoiding
the complex, time-consuming and expensive process of litigation.2

1. M. DOMKE, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 100-07 (1965). The author states: "Resort to
arbitration has become increasingly important in keeping the avenues of trade free of
obstructive devices, and businessmen of different countries have come to recognize arbitration as the most successful method of settling commercial disputes arising in the ordinary
course of foreign trade." Id. at 101. This success is attributed to the fast, efficient and
impartial nature of the arbitration process. Id. Domke stresses the necessity of arbitration to
prevent controversies from extending unsettled for long periods of time, which hampers
amicable business relations. Id. Allowing these delays in dispute resolution would add to the
already too many obstacles of international trade, such as: export and import restrictions,
quotas, licensing, foreign exchange control and preferences in favor of domestic merchants.
Id.
It has become more and more recognized that for the settlement of disputes between
parties to an international transaction, arbitration has clear advantages over litigation in national courts. The foreign court can be an alien environment for a
businessman because of his unfamiliarity with the procedure which may be followed, the laws to be applied, and even the mentality of the foreign judges. In
contrast, with international commercial arbitration parties coming from different
legal systems can provide for a procedure which is mutually acceptable. They can
anticipate which law shall be applied: a particular law or even a lex mercatoria of a
trade. They can also appoint a person of their choice having expert knowledge in the
field
A.J. VAN DEN BERc, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958, at 1 (1981). "The
businessman doing business in several countries has an additional reason for preferring
arbitration to local judicial remedies-the fear of discrimination against the foreigner,
consciously felt in actual bias or unconsciously exhibited by preference for local principles of
law." Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1051 (1961);
See also Comment, International Commercial Arbitration Under the United Nations Convention and the Amended Federal Arbitration Statute, 47 WASH. L. REV. 441, 442 (1972)
(stresses the need for an effective arbitral remedy due to increased international trade and
commerce).
2. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 1049:
From the days of the early English "piepowder" courts, where merchants with the
dust of the market still on their feet stepped into a tribunal of merchants for swift
resolution of their disputes, businessmen have preferred arbitration, a process which
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One recurring problem, however, is enforcement of arbitration
agreements and the resulting awards when the recalcitrant party is
3
a government entity and asserts the defense of sovereign immunity.
By claiming immunity from the jurisdiction of the United States
they think combines finality of decision with speed, low expense, and flexibility in
the selection of principles and mercantile customs to be used in solving a problem,
over litigation.
Id. See also Bergeson v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 929 (2d Cir. 1983) ("International merchants often prefer arbitration over litigation because it is faster, less expensive and
more flexible."); McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign
Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 735, 735 (1971) ("Arbitration is
speedier, more efficient and economical, and better suited to the settlement of disputes
involving parties of diverse nationalities ....").Arbitration is a self-regulatory method of
dispute resolution in the nature of a judicial process, whereby parties to a contract voluntarily
agree to submit their disputes to impartial third persons, the arbitrators. M. DOMKE, supra
note 1, at 2. The decision or award of the arbitrators is based upon evidence and testimony
presented at hearings before the arbitral tribunal. Id. Principles of law and rules of evidence
are not generally applied. Id. at 3. The arbitrators' award is final and binding and is not open
to review by courts for errors in findings of fact or law. Id.
3. See Domke, The Enforcement of Maritime Arbitration Agreements With Foreign
Governments, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 617, 618 (1971). Domke asserts: "Foreign governments
are sometimes reluctant to abide by their agreement to arbitrate. In such cases, they are
inclined to invoke sovereign immunity from foreign jurisdictions and from execution in a
proceeding to enforce the arbitration agreement or an award rendered pursuant thereto." Id.
"Sovereign immunity is a doctrine of international law under which domestic courts, in
appropriate cases, relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state." H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONe. & Ao. NEWS 6604, 6606 [hereinafter
cited as HousE REPORT]. Sovereign immunity has also been defined as a doctrine which
"precludes a litigant from asserting an otherwise meritorious cause of action against a
sovereign or a party with sovereign attributes unless the sovereign consents to suit." Principe
Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Board of Comm'rs, 333 F. Supp. 353, 355 (E.D. La. 1971). The
Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law enumerates the exact entities that can be afforded
sovereign immunity:
a) the state itself;
b) its head of state and those designated by him as members of his official party;
c) its government;
d) its head of government and those designated by him as members of his official
party;
e) its foreign minister and those designated by him as members of his official party;
f) its governmental agencies;
g) other public ministers, officials and agents of the state with respect to acts
performed in their official capacity if the effect of exercising jurisdiction would be to
enforce a rule of law against the state;
h) a corporation created under its laws and exercising functions comparable to
those of a department or agency of the state.
RESTATEMENT OF THE FoEI N RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 69 (Proposed Official
Draft 1962) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT]. The comment to this section defines
"agency" as:
[A] body having the nature of a government department or ministry. It does not
include every person or entity acting as an agent for the state. The question in each
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action is brought, the sovereign can
court where the enforcement
4
defeat enforcement.

A significant aspect of this problem involves the interrelation
of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards 5 (Convention) and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19766 (FSIA). The Convention, adopted in the United
States in 1970,7 provides jurisdiction for actions to enforce foreign
arbitration agreements and awards in signatory countries., Under
section 1605(a)(1) of the FSIA, a party's agreement to arbitrate in
the United States is considered consent to enforcement of that
agreement and, therefore, a waiver of sovereign immunity in enforcement actions. 9 Lawsuits concerning the sovereign immunity
case is whether the relationship between the state and the agency, established by the
law of the state creating the agency, in fact makes it a part of the government of the
state. In determining whether the agency is in fact a part of the government, the
views of the government creating the agency are given great weight, but are not
necessarily conclusive.
Id. comment b.
4. Domke, supra note 3, at 618. See also Maritime Int'l Nominees Estab. v. Republic of
Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71 (1983), Maritime
International involved a suit to confirm an arbitration award in which the Republic of
Guinea asserted the sovereign immunity defense. The court of appeals reversed the lower
court decision and held that the suit did not fall under any of the enumerated exceptions of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1976), and, therefore, the
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award. Maritime Jnt, 693 F.2d at
1112.
5. Opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter cited as Convention]. The Convention is also known as the New
York Convention because it was drafted and adopted at the Conference of International
Commercial Arbitration at the United Nations Center in New York.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1330, 1332(a)(2)-(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as FSIA].
7. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982). The Convention entered into force and effect in the
United States on December 29, 1970. 21 U.S.T. at 2517.
8. 9 U.S.C. 8§ 202-203. Section 202 states that: "An arbitration agreement or arbitral
award arising out of a legal relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as
commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this
title, falls under the Convention." Id. § 202. Section 203, which confers jurisdiction states:
[A]n action or proceeding falling under the Convention shall be deemed to arise
under the laws and treaties of the United States. The district courts of the United
States (including the courts enumerated in section 460 of title 28) shall have original
jurisdiction over such an action or proceeding, regardless of the amount in controversy.
Id. § 203.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976). This section, called the "waiver exception," provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case(1) in which the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by
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defense in arbitration enforcement actions have raised the issue as
to whether a sovereign's agreement to arbitration enforcement in
signatory countries under the Convention has the same effect as an
agreement to arbitrate in the United States as construed under the
waiver exception of the FSIA.' 0 Repeated reference has been made
to the Convention in discussions of the waiver issue in arbitration
enforcement actions, although nothing conclusive has been established.'I
This Note examines the interrelationship between the Convention and the FSIA, specifically, whether a sovereign's ratification of
the Convention consitutes a waiver of immunity under section
1605(a)(1) of the FSIA in actions to enforce arbitration agreements
and awards. The development of sovereign immunity law in arbitration enforcement actions, pre-FSIA and under the FSIA's
"waiver" exception, is reviewed in light of the Convention.' 2 The
confusion over the Convention as it affects sovereign immunity is
discussed,' 3 and a resolution of the issue is proposed in favor of
barring the sovereign immunity defense in actions falling under the
Convention.
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign
state may purport to effect except in accordance with the terms of the waiver.
Id. Section 456 of the Restatement (Revised) of the Foreign Relations Law states:
(2) Under the law of the United States:
(b) an agreement to arbitrate is a waiver of immunity from jurisdiction in
(1) an action or other proceeding to compel arbitration pursuant to the
agreement;
(2) an action to enforce an arbitral award rendered pursuant to the
agreement.
RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 456(2)(b)
[hereinafter cited as DRAFr RESTATEMENT]. See infra text accompanying notes 151-58.
10. See Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp.
1175 (D.D.C. 1980) [hereinafter cited as LIAMCO]; Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic
of Nig., 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978). Both actions involved petitions to confirm arbitration awards where respondents' assertions of the sovereign immunity defense were denied by
the courts. The court's holding in Ipitrade apparently' rested on two factors: 1) that the
parties had agreed to arbitrate in the underlying contract, and 2) that the suits received
subject matter jurisdiction from the Convention. 465 F. Supp. at 826. The LIAMCO court
rested its holding on the agreement to arbitrate citing Ipitrade for support. 482 F. Supp. at
1178. The language of both decisions, Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 826-27; LIAMCO, 482 F.
Supp. at 1178, however, is rather unclear, leaving room for speculation as to the courts' exact
rationale. DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 456, reporters' note 1. See infra text accompanying notes 159-205.
11. See infra notes 159-211 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 85-205 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 170-211 and accompanying text.
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I.

ARBITRATION ENFORCEMENT

Arbitration is a self-regulatory process by which parties to a
contract voluntarily agree to submit their disputes to an impartial
third party, the arbitrator. 14 An arbitrator's decision or award is
binding on the parties and is not open to judicial review for errors
in findings of law or fact.1 5 Nonetheless, an arbitration agreement
and resulting award can be worthless unless enforced.16
The most common obstacles to successful arbitration stem
from this procedural aspect of it, specifically, the initiation of the
proceedings and enforcement of the award.' 7 For resolution of these
problems a court action may be instituted.' 8 In the United States,
subject matter jurisdiction over such actions is granted under either
the United States Arbitration Act' 9 (Arbitration Act) or the Convention. 20 The Arbitration Act covers enforcement of domestic arbitration agreements and awards arising from commercial or maritime
disputes, 21 and the Convention covers enforcement of foreign agree14. See M. DoMKE, supra note 1, at 2.
15. Id. at 3; see infra note 36 and accompanying text.
16. See McMahon, supra note 2, at 735. "Arbitration is speedier, more efficient and
economical, and better suited to the settlement of disputes involving parties of diverse
nationalities only so long as specific performance of an agreement to arbitrate will be readily
ordered and arbitral awards receive the benefit of summary enforcement proceedings and are
not extensively reviewed." Id. See also Comment, supra note 1, at 442-43. The author sets
forth three elements necessary for effective arbitration: 1) an agreement to arbitrate; 2) a
generally recognized system for arbitration; and 3) a method for enforcing and recognizing
awards resulting from arbitration. Id. In stressing the third factor he states:
The third element requires the development of judicial machinery which will
provide a reasonable opportunity for enforcement of the arbitral remedy with a
minimum of distinction between foreign and domestic arbitration. It is this requirement which has been the most troublesome . . . . It must be fulfilled both at the
national and international levels.
Id. at 443.
17. See M. DOMKE, supra note 1, at 61-66, 94-99.
18. See id.
19. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982). The purpose of the Arbitration Act, as explained in the
House Report, is "to make valid and enforcible [sic] agreements for arbitration contained in
contracts involving interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or [sic] admiralty, or
which may be the subject of litigation in the Federal courts." H.R. REa. No. 96, 68th Cong.,
1st Sess. 1, 1 (1924). The House Report continued: "The bill declares simply that such
agreements for arbitration shall be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts
for their enforcement." Id.at 2.
20. 9 U.S.C. § 203 (1982).
21. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
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ments or awards involving commercial disputes. 22 The same procedure is followed under both statutes due to a provision in the
Convention that the enforcing court follow the procedure custom23
arily used in that forum.
Under United States law, the procedure for enforcement of
arbitration agreements is very similar to that of enforcement of
arbitration awards. To enforce an arbitration agreement a petition
24
is filed in the appropriate court for an order directing arbitration.
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract.
Id.
22. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982). Section 202 states:
An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal relationship,
whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the
Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is
entirely between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the
Convention unless that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one
or more foreign states. For the purpose of this section a corporation is a citizen of the
United States if it is incorporated or has its principal place of business in the United
States.
Id. See infra notes 46-48, 72-77 and accompanying text. The Convention applies to awards
made in a state other than that in which enforcement is sought and those not considered
domestic. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(1). Also, upon ratification of the Convention, the
United States adopted a reservation which limits United States application of the Convention
to commercial disputes. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(3).
23. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
24. See M. DOMKE, supra note 1, at 61-62.
When one party refuses to proceed to arbitration, the party claiming the right
to arbitrate may apply to an appropriate court for an order directing arbitration in
accordance with the terms of the contract ....
The enforcement of the agreement by a court is a result of statutes in the
leading commercial states which specifically stipulate the validity, enforceability,
and irrevocability of such agreements.
Id. The statutory authority for such relief is under section 4 of the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.
§ 4 (1982), which provides in pertinent part:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate
under a written agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district
court which, save for such agreement, would have jurisdiction under Title 28, in a
civil action or in admiralty of the subject matter of a suit arising out of the
controversy between the parties, for an order directing that such arbitration proceed
in the manner provided for in such agreement . . . . The court shall hear the
parties, and upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or
the failure to comply therewith is not in issue, the court shall make an order
directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.
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The petitioner must show that an agreement to arbitrate was in fact
made, 25 a dispute arose,2 and that the other party has failed to
comply with a demand for arbitration.27 The merits of the dispute
are not at issue but are left for determination by the arbitrator. 28
To enforce an arbitration award, a petition for an order directing judgment to be entered on the award is filed. 29 This judgment
has the same force and effect as an ordinary judgment.30 To insure
such court control of the arbitral process, many arbitration agreements expressly provide that "judgment upon the award by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction

25. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
26. See M. DOMKE, supra note 1, at 63-64. "An arbitration must have an actual dispute
as its basis. The requirements for an arbitrable dispute are generally not as strict as for cases
brought before a court. . . . However, what has been termed a 'bona fide' dispute must have
arisen." Id. at 63.
27. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
28. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (function of the court is limited to ascertaining whether party seeking arbitration is making claim
that, on its face, is governed by contract in issue); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin
Mfg. Co., 360 F.2d 315 (2d Cir. 1966) (court is required to order arbitration when satisfied
that making of agreement for arbitration or failure to comply therewith is not in issue), ajf'd,
388 U.S. 395 (1967); Sumitomo Corp. v. Parakopi Compania Maritima, S.A., 477 F. Supp.
737 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (claim that petitioners do not have arbitral claim because there was no
breach of contract clearly goes to the merits and thus does not constitute grounds for
dismissing the petition). See also M. DOMKE, supra note 1, at 64. Domke states: "A dispute
that the opposing party thinks rests on a frivolous demand will not be removed from the
arbitration process. The court will not decide in advance whether the claim is meritorious or
not, but will leave the question to the arbitrator." Id.
29. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1976). Statutory authority for confirmation of an arbitration award is
pursuant to section 9 of the Arbitration Act, which provides in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall
be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the
court, then at any time within one year after the award is made any party to the
arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming the award,
and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated,
modified, or corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is
specified in the agreement of the parties, then such application may be made to the
United States court in and for the district within which such award was made.
Id.
30. 9 U.S.C. § 13. This section states:
The judgment shall be docketed as if it was rendered in an action.
The judgment so entered shall have the same force and effect, in all respects, as, and
be subject to all the provisions of law relating to, a judgment in an action; and it
may be enforced as if it had been rendered in an action in the court in which it is
entered.
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thereof. ' 3' In fact, section 9 of the Arbitration Act 32 expressly requires that the parties agree in their contract that a judgment shall
be entered upon the arbitral award. 33 The only other requirements
for judicial confirmation are production of the award 34 and that the
35
action be brought within one year after the award is made.
Similar to the enforcement of an arbitration agreement, the merits
of the dispute are not at issue nor are the legal or factual findings of
the arbitrator. 36 The only grounds upon which a court may vacate
or refuse to confirm an arbitral award involve bias, misconduct or
bad faith on the part of the arbitrator.3 7
Id. See M. DoME, supra note 1, at 95.
31. See M. DoME, supra note I at 95. For example, the New York Produce Exchange
Arbitration Clause contains the following language: "[The arbitrators'] decision, or that of
any two of them, shall be final and for the purposes of enforcing any award this agreement
may be made a rule of the Court." New York Produce Exchange Form Time Charter (Code
Name: ASBATIME), reprinted in M. WILFORD, T. COGHLIN, N.J. HEALY JR. & J.D. KIMBALL, TIME CHARTERS 489 (1982) [hereinafter cited as TIME CHARTERS]. Whereas the STB
Tanker Time Charter Arbitration Clause provides: "Awards pursuant to this Clause may
include costs, including a reasonable allowance for attorney's fees, and judgment may be
entered upon any award made hereunder in any Court having jurisdiction in the premises."
Id. at 484. Both clauses serve the same purpose to allow for court confirmation of the award
under the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1982).
32. 9 U.S.C. § 9.
33. Id. Section 9 states that the parties must have agreed in the contract that judgment
shall be entered upon the award in order to apply to a court for confirmation of the award.
Id. Nevertheless, courts have not strictly interpreted this provision. See, e.g., Marine Transp.
Co. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263, 276 (1932) (judgment entered on award even though arbitration agreement did not provide for it); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500
F.2d 424, 427 (2d Cir. 1974) (judgment was entered on award absent specific provision for it
in the contract; however, parties were held to have consented to jurisdiction of the court for
confirmation by moving to vacate the award).
34. 9 U.S.C. § 9
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593, 599 (1960) (interpretation of collective bargaining contract is for the arbitrator and not
within the court's power to review); Rossi v. Trans World Airlines, 507 F.2d 404, 405 (9th
Cir. 1974) (court will not second guess arbitrators' application of common law). Domke states
that:
When an award is challenged, one trend in modern arbitration law is apparent:
courts will not review the facts found by the arbitrator, his interpretation of the
contract terms, or his application of the law. Courts do not wish to reopen an
arbitration proceeding in another forum, by reviewing the merits of an award. Such
a review would lead to a second proceeding with legal technicalities that the parties
intended to avoid. It would substitute the court's judgment for that of the arbitrators and destroy the very aim of arbitration, which is to have a speedy determination of the issues submitted to experts in whom the parties had expressed confidence.
M. DomE, supra note 1, at 98-99.
37. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1982). This section states the grounds upon which an award can be
vacated. The statute provides in pertinent part:
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II.

THE CONVENTION

The Convention was conceived in response to the international
business community's need to expedite the flow of international
trade through prompt resolution of disputes.38 Because previous
international agreements on arbitration 3 had proven ineffective
with respect to enforcement, 40 representatives of forty-five nations
convened in 1958 at the United Nations Conference on International Commercial Arbitration to devise an enforcement mechanism .41 The purpose of the Convention was to promote enforcement

(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the
hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any
party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them
that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not
made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required
the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a
rehearing by the arbitrators.
Id.
38. U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/SR.21, at 3 (1958).
39. These agreements are the Protocol on Arbitration Clauses, Sept. 24, 1923, 27
L.N.T.S. 157, and the Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26,
1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301, otherwise known as the Geneva Protocol and 1927 Geneva Convention respectively. For a discussion of these treaties, see Quigley, supra note 1, at 1054-55.
40. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 1054. There were a number of reasons for the
ineffectiveness of these treaties: 1) The treaties were not self-executing and, therefore, enacting legislation varied from country to country, leaving doubt as to the extent to which each
country carried out its obligations under the treaties; 2) the burden of proof was placed on the
party seeking enforcement thereby making resistance easier; and 3) the treaties require
diversity of citizenship which caused confusion due to the varying national policies with
regard to defining nationality. Id. See also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. 710 F.2d 928 (2d
Cir. 1983). In Bergesen, the court stated:
International merchants often prefer arbitration over litigation because it is faster,
less expensive and more flexible. But previous international agreements had not
proved effective in securing enforcement of arbitral awards; nor had private arbitration through the American Arbitration Association, the International Chamber
of Commerce, the London Court of Arbitration and the like been completely
satisfactory because of problems in enforcing awards.
Id. at 929.
41. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 1059-60.
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of arbitration agreements and awards in international contracts
42
through liberalization and unification of enforcement standards.
The Convention was drafted to allow for: 1) broad application; 2) avoidance of the complexities and varieties of national legal
systems; and 3) acceptance of full universality of international provisions relating to arbitration. 43 This was accomplished by provid42. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974). The goal of the
Convention, and the purpose underlying United States adoption of it, was to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts
and to unify the standards by which they are observed and the resulting awards are enforced
in signatory countries. Id. See also Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale
de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. 1974). The Parsons & Whittemore court
stated:
The 1958 Convention's basic thrust was to liberalize procedures for enforcing foreign arbitral awards: While the Geneva Convention placed the burden of proof on
the party seeking enforcement of a foreign arbitral award and did not circumscribe
the range of available defenses to those enumerated in the convention, the 1958
Convention clearly shifted the burden of proof to the party defending against
enforcement and limited his defenses to seven set forth in Article V.
Id. at 973.
43. U.N. Doc E/Conf.26/4, at 18-19 (1958). At the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration, the following factors were listed as major obstacles to
the progress of arbitration as a means of dispute settlement in international commerce:
(a) Differences in national laws with respect to arbitration procedures;
(b) Uncertainty regarding the exclusion of the Court's jurisdiction where there is an
arbitration agreement;
(c) Difficulties in determining the law applicable to the validity of an arbitration
agreement, the arbitration procedure and the determination of the issue;
(d) Uncertainty regarding the powers of the arbitral tribunal to decide on such
matters, as:
(i) its own competence with respect to the matter in dispute, and in particular, its
competence to determine whether the issue is arbitrable; (ii) the extent to which it
may decide ex aequo et bono rather than on the basis of a given law;
(e) Requirements in some countries as to the nationality of arbitrators;
(f) Difficulty of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards;
(g) Uncertainty as to whether and to what extent the courts have the power to view
the validity of arbitral awards for alleged incompetence of the arbitral tribunal or
for other reasons;
(h) Lack of uniformity in the rules of arbitral tribunals;
(i) Lack of a standard arbitration clause or inadequacy of arbitration clauses
generally used in dealing with such problems as the procedure to be followed where
the parties are unable to agree on the designation of the arbitral tribunal or the
fixing of the place of arbitration;
(j) Insufficient arbitration facilities;
(k) Obstacles to the transfer of currency for the payment of arbitral awards and
costs.
Id. In response to these obstacles, Delegate Haight of the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) proposed that the Conference, in drafting the Convention, adopt a simple and
flexible system for enforcement. U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/SR.3, at 6-7 (1958). This system
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ing a simple procedure for enforcement and placing a significantly
heavier burden on the resisting party. 44 The scope of the Convention is very broad. 45 It encompasses awards made in a state other
46
than the judicial forum and awards "not considered as domestic

would cover the "widest possible area" of international disputes, avoid difficulties inherent in
reference to municipal laws of a country, provide for swift enforcement on the basis that the
award was final and limit the grounds for refusal of enforcement. See id. Delegate Holleaux
of France encouraged efforts to render international arbitration as universally effective as
possible by simplifying the formalities of enforcement. Id. at 3.
44. U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/SR.25, at 2 (1958). The Secretary-General of the 1958 United
Nations Conference stated of the Convention's anticipated advantages:
[I]t was already apparent that the document represented an improvement on the
Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider definition of the awards to which the
Convention applied; it reduced and simplified the requirements with which the
party seeking recognition or enforcement of an award would have to comply; it
placed the burden of proof on the party against whom recognition or enforcement
was invoked; it gave the parties greater freedom in the choice of the arbitral
authority and of the arbitration procedure; it gave the authority before which the
award was sought to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the
enforcement to give suitable security.
Id.
45. A.J, VAN DEN BERG, supra note 1, at 12. "[A]n award made in any foreign country,
whether in a Contracting State or not, falls under the New York Convention." Id. For a
synopsis of the Conference discussions on the scope of the Convention, see U.N. Doe.
E/Conf.26/2, at 2-4 (1958).
46. Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). The corresponding section of the United States
implementing legislation, 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982), states:
An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely between
citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless
that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign
states.
Id. Construction of the Convention's language "not considered as domestic" has been a source
of controversy in cases where the arbitral award was rendered in this country, yet involved
foreign parties or the application of foreign law. For example, in Transmarine Seaways
Corp. of Monrovia v. Marc Rich & Co., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y.), afJ'd mer., 614 F.2d
1291 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980), the court confirmed an award under
the Convention which was rendered in New York involving foreign parties. Id. at 353.
Whereas, in Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba Ltd., No. 78-3263, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. June
28, 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 626 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1980), the court held that the
Convention did not apply to a New York award involving a United States corporation and a
foreign corporation. Id. In 1983, however, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that an award rendered in New York where the parties involved were foreign did come
within the scope of the Convention. Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932. The court held:
We adopt the view that awards "not considered as domestic" denotes awards which
are subject to the Convention not because made abroad, but because made within
the legal framework of another country, e.g., pronounced in accordance with
foreign law or involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of business
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in the forum state.47 It covers all written agreements in which
parties agree to arbitrate any dispute arising in a defined legal
relationship .48
There are few requirements to be met by the party seeking
enforcement under the Convention. 4 Article IV requires production of either the original or a certified copy of the arbitration
agreement and award. 50 Such production establishes a prima facie
case, and the burden then shifts to the party opposing enforcement. 51 Placing the burden of proof on the resisting party is significant because it shifts the affirmative to respondent and thus makes
resistance more difficult.52 Another deterrent to resistance is that
under article VI the enforcing court may order the opposing party
to post security in an amount suitable to the circumstances of the
dispute. 53
outside the enforcing jurisdiction. We prefer this broader construction because it is
more in line with the intended purpose of the treaty, which was entered into to
encourage the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards.
Id. (citations omitted)
47. See Convention, supra note 5, art. I(1). This article provides that:
1. This Convention shall apply to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards made in the territory of a State other than the State where the recognition
and enforcement of such awards are sought, and arising out of differences between
persons, whether physical or legal. It shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are
sought.
Id.
48. See id. art. II(1). This article provides that:
1. Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under
which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which
have arisen or which may arise between them in respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of settlement
by arbitration.
Id.
49. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe de l'Industrie du Papier,
508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974).
50. Convention, supra note 5, art. IV(1). This article provides that:
1. To obtain the recognition and enforcement mentioned in the preceding
article, the party applying for recognition and enforcement shall, at the time of the
application, supply:
(a) The duly authenticated original award or a duly certified copy thereof;
(b) The original agreement referred to in article II or a duly certified copy
thereof.
Id.
51. See Quigley, supra note 1, at 1066.
52. See id.
53. Convention, supra note 5, art. VI. This article provides that:
If an application for the setting aside or suspension of the award has been made
to a competent authority referred to in article V(1)(e), the authority before which
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The only procedural guideline given in the Convention is in
article Ii. 54 This section authorizes the enforcing court to follow
the procedure customarily used in that forum.5 5 Thus, United States
courts may invoke the procedure followed under the Arbitration
Act. 5 More importantly, this enables enforcing courts to avoid the
57
complexities of following another nation's procedural system.
The delegates who drafted the Convention sought a precise
definition of judicial control to prevent a party from objecting
without adequate justification. 58 They limited the number of
grounds for withholding enforcement to avoid any unnecessary
frustration of the arbitral process. 59 As set forth in article V(1),
these grounds are as follows: 1) the parties were under some incapacity or the agreement is otherwise invalid; 2) proper notice of the
proceeding or the appointment of the arbitrator was not given to
the party against whom enforcement is sought; 3) the award deals
with differences not contemplated by the terms of the submission to

the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the
decision on the enforcement of the award and may also, on the application of the
party claiming enforcement of the award, order the other party to give suitable
security.
Id.
54. Convention, supra note 5, art. III.
55. Id. Article III provides that:
Each Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce
them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is
relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the following articles. There shall
not be imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on
the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies
than are imposed on the recognition or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.
Id.
56. See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text.
57. At the United Nations Conference, Delegate Haight of the ICC referred to the
complexities and varieties of national legal systems as a major barrier to the free flow of
international trade. U.N. Doc. E/Conf.26/SR.3, at 5-6 (1958). See also supra note 43 (the
first of a number of obstacles to the progress of arbitration, listed at the Conference, was
differences in national laws with respect to arbitration procedures).
58. U.N. Doe. E/Conf.26/2, at 5-6 (1958). The extent of judicial control over the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards must be defined with precision, so as to avoid
the possibility that a losing party could invoke without adequate justification a multiplicity of
possible grounds for objections in order to frustrate the enforcement of awards rendered
against it. Id. at 5.
59. Id. at 5-6. The Secretary-General of the Conference stated: "[T]he general tendency
of the [Delegates'] comments is to seek a reduction of the grounds on which recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award can be refused." Id.
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arbitration; 4) the arbitral tribunal or procedure fails to conform to
the agreement of the parties; and 5) the award has not yet become
binding or has been set aside or suspended by a competent authority
in the jurisdiction where the award was made.60 Jurisdictional
defenses such as foreign sovereign immunity were clearly not contemplated.
The grounds upon which a court or "competent authority"
may refuse enforcement are somewhat broader in scope. Article
11(3) provides, in pertinent part: "The court of a Contracting State,
.. .[shall], at the request of one of the parties, refer the parties to
arbitration, unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed." 61 In addition, article
V(2) states:
2. Recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award may

also be refused if the competent authority in the country where
recognition and enforcement is sought finds that:
(a) The subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the laws of that country, or
(b) The recognition or enforcement of the award would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.6 2
It is likewise doubtful that either of these grounds would encompass
the sovereign immunity defense. Sovereign immunity would neither render an agreement "null and void, inoperative or incapable
of being performed, 6 3 nor would it render the subject matter of the
64
dispute incapable of settlement by arbitration.

60. Convention, supra note 5, art. V(1). An important aspect of this section is the
opening language which states that enforcement "may be refused," creating a permissive tone
whereby refusal is placed in the discretion of the court. A.J. VAN DEN BERC, supra note 1, at
265. Furthermore, the grounds provided in article V are exhaustive. They are the only
grounds upon which a resisting party can defeat enforcement. Id. at 265.
61. Convention, supra note 5, art. III.
62. Id. art. V(2).
63. Id. art. 11(3). See Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e
Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983). The Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that an agreement is "null and void" only when "it is subject to an internationally recognized defense such as duress, mistake, fraud, or waiver, or when it contravenes
fundamental policies of the forum state. The "null and void' language must be read narrowly,
for the signatory nations have jointly declared a policy of enforceability of agreements to
arbitrate." Id. at 53 (citations omitted). In an earlier case, the first circuit stated: "[T]he
clause must be interpreted to encompass only those situations-such as fraud, mistake,
duress, and waiver-that can be applied neutrally on an international scale." Ledee v.
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The public policy exception is the only ground that might
feasibly encompass the sovereign immunity defense.6 5 Courts, however, narrowly construe this exception,6 6 stressing the need to prevent the recalcitrant party from defeating enforcement merely by
raising general policy principles that have been transgressed by the
award.6 7 In addition, narrow construction is encouraged in order to
support the pro-enforcement policy behind the Convention. 8 As a
result, the public policy exception has been successfully invoked

Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (lst Cir. 1982). See also I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar
Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981).
64. A.J. VAN DEN BEac, supra note 1, at 369. Van den Berg states in reference to this
section: "The non-arbitrability of a subject matter reflects a special national interest in
judicial, rather than arbitral resolution of disputes. Classic examples of non-arbitral subject
matters are anti-trust, the validity of intellectual property rights (patents, trademarks, etc.),
family law and the protection of certain weaker parties." Id.
65. See Convention, supra note 5, art. V(2)(b).
66. See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975). The court
held: "[W]e have recently indicated that the 'public policy' limitation on the Convention is to
be construed narrowly to be applied only where enforcement would violate the forum state's
most basic notions of morality and justice." Id. at 516. See also Parsons & Whittemore
Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974);
Saxis Steamship Co. v. Multifacs Int'l Traders, Inc., 375 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir. 1967); Sea
Dragon, Inc. v. Gebr. Van Weelde Scheepvaartkantoor B.V., 574 F. Supp. 367, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). One commentator writes: "Pursuant to the notion of international public
policy, a violation of public policy is to be deemed present in very serious cases only ....
Article V(2) (a) and (b) can be said to refer to international public policy as has been expressly
or implicitly affirmed by asubstantial number of courts." A.J. VAN DEN BERc, supra note 1, at
382.
67. Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Overseas Private Inv. Corp., 628 F.2d 81 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 983 (1980). The court held that the public policy exception is
"not available for every party who manages to find some generally accepted principle which
is transgressed by the award. Rather, the award must be so misconceived that it 'compels the
violation of law or conduct contrary to accepted public policy.' " Id. at 83 (quoting Union
Employers Div. of Printing Indus., Inc. v. Columbia Typograph Union No. 101, 353 F.
Supp. 1348, 1349 (D.D.C. 1973), afJ'd mer., 492 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
68. Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d at 973-74. The court stated:
Perhaps more probative, however, are the inferences to be drawn from the history
of the Convention as a whole. The general pro-enforcement bias in forming the
Convention and explaining its supersession of the Geneva Convention points toward
a narrow reading of the public policy defense. An expansive construction of this
defense would vitiate the Convention's basic effort to remove preexisting obstacles to
enforcement.
Id. at 973. In a report on Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e
Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3d Cir. 1983) in the American Journalof International
Law, the author states: "The decision in this case is consistent with the overwhelming
endorsement by National Courts of the arbitration process and the essential purpose of the
Convention. Here, the court sensibly refused to frustrate that purpose on the basis of a
parochial rule merely technical in nature." 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 219 (1984).
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only in cases involving more substantive issues, such as the legality
of the Securities Act6 9 or antitrust violations, 70 rather than jurisdic71
tional issues.
Furthermore, under article 1(3) of the Convention, signatories
are permitted to qualify their accession to the Convention by adopting certain reservations. 72 The first, the "reciprocity" reservation,
limits a state's obligation under the Convention to enforcement of
awards made in another contracting state. 73 The second reservation
limits application of the Convention to differences which are considered commercial under the law of the ratifying state. 74 The
United States adopted both reservations.7 5 In doing so, it limited
application of the Convention in the United States to "commercial
legal relationships, ' 76 an area traditionally excepted from the sover77
eign immunity defense under United States and international law.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)(aa) (1982). See, e.g., Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953)
(questions concerning the legality of the Securities Act were held nonarbitrable as against
public policy).
70. See, e.g., American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 828
(2d Cir. 1968) (questions concerning alleged antitrust violations held nonarbitrable as against
public policy). See generally Aksen, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of
Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw. U.L. REv. 1, 13 (1971). The author states:
According to competent authority, the provision denying enforcement because of
local public policy was "unavoidable," even though it has the effect of relegating the
ultimate decision on the applicability of the Convention to the good faith of the
contracting countries. This is so because there really is no practical limit to the types
of situations which each country would include within its own public policy.
Id.
71. " '[In 100 cases applying the New York Convention, enforcement has been refused
for reasons of public policy only three times.' The three cases denying enforcement dealt with
violations of the forum's states public policy that were far more substantive than procedural."
78 Am J. INT'L L. 219, 219 n.9 (1984) (quoting Sanders, A Twenty Years Review of the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 13 INT'L LAW.
269, 271 (1979).
72. Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(3).
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1982).
76. Id.
77. Following the lead of the international community, the United States adopted the
restrictive theory in 1952, which excepted from sovereign immunity all disputes arising from
the commercial or public acts of a foreign state. Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal
Advisor, Dep't of State, to Phillip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19, 1952),
reprintedin 26 DEP'T ST. BULL. 984 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Tate Letter]. This theory was
adopted in order to protect the interests of private individuals engaging in business transactions with foreign governments and their agencies, by enabling them to have their rights
determined in the courts. Id. at 985. See infra text accompanying notes 88-94.
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When the United States acceded to the Convention in 1970,78
Congress felt it was in the best interests of United States businessmen involved in international trade. 7 Because the Convention provides for enforcement in both United States and foreign courts, 80
Congress believed accession to the Convention would encourage
Americans doing business abroad to submit their disputes to arbitration. 81 Unfortunately, due to its broad terms, the Convention has
frequently been a source of confusion for courts attempting to
construe it. 2 Nevertheless. these veneral terms are also considered
78. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1982).
79. H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 3601, 3602.
80. Convention, supra note 5, arts. I(1), 11(1). As van den Berg notes:
[T]he advantages [of arbitration] are only potential until the necessary legal framework can be internationally secured. This legal framework should at least provide
that the commitment to arbitrate is enforceable and that the arbitral decision can be
executed in many countries, precluding the possibility that a national court review
the merits of the decision.
One finds such framework in the New York Convention. The Convention has
been adhered to in 56 states . . . among which are almost all important trading
nations from the Capitalist and Socialist world as well as many developing countries.
A.J. VAN DEN BsEc, supra note 1, at 1.
81. See H.R. REP. No. 1181, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprintedin 1970 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 3601, 3602.
82. See, e.g., Rhone Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50 (3rd Cir. 1983). In Rhone Mediterranee,the issue was raised as to
what law determines whether the agreement is "null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed" under article II of the Convention. Id. The court stated:
It thus appears that the ambiguity in Article II section 3 is deliberate. How it should
be resolved has been a matter of concern to commentators, who suggest, variously,
that the forum state should look to its own law and policy, to the rules of conflicts of
laws, or to the law of the place of execution of the agreement.
Id. at 53. The court concluded that under United States law the agreement to arbitrate was
not null and void, and therefore affirmed the lower court order staying the action pending
arbitration. Id. at 55. See also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).
The issue in Bergesen was whether the Convention applies to a New York arbitration award
arising between two foreign parties. Id. The court stated:
In resolving the question presented on this appeal, we are faced with the difficult
task of construing the Convention. The family of nations has endlessly-some say
since the Tower of Babel-sought to breach the barrier of language. As illustrated
by the proceedings at this conference, the delegates had to comprehend concepts
familiar in one state that had no counterpart in others and to compromise entrenched and differing national commercial interests. Concededly, 45 nations cannot be expected to produce a document with the clear precision of a mathematical
formula. Faced with the formidable obstacles to agreement, the wonder is that
there is a Convention at all, much less one that is serviceable and enforceable.
Id. at 929. The court held, affirming the district court decision, that the Convention did
encompass such awards. Id. at 934.
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to be the Convention's greatest virtue because they allow for wide
and successful application. 83 As one proponent of the Convention
stated:
The Convention is an attempt to create a streamlined procedure for enforcing foreign arbitral awards, which, as might be
expected of a multilateral convention on a subject where national laws differ so greatly, is phrased in general terms to which
the courts or other competent authorities of the contracting
states must give meaning. The record suggests that the convention may well prove to be the most useful weapon yet in the
84
swift resolution of international commercial disputes.

III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOVEREIGN
IMMUNITY DEFENSE IN ARBITRATION
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
A.

Pre-FSIA: The Restrictive Theory

The sovereign immunity defense was originally recognized in
the United States according to the "absolute" theory.8 5 Foreign
governments were completely protected from private suit regardless
of the nature or purpose of the underlying transaction. 8 The theory
was that the King could do no wrong and would be offended by
actions which impinged on his dignity and power. 87 With the shift
toward more impersonal government bureaucracies, however, the
treatment of the sovereign immunity defense also changed.8 8 In
1952, in the widely published Tate Letter8" the United States

83. See supra notes 43-71 and accompanying text.
84. Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 58 A.B.A. J.821, 826 (1972).
85. Victory Transp., Inc. v. ComisariA Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transp., 336 F.2d
354, 357 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). For a detailed discussion of the
development of the principle of sovereign immunity, see id. at 357-62. See also von Mehren,
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 34-43
(1978); Note, Defenses to InternationalAntitrust Suits: An Aggregate Approach, 5 FORDMAM
INT'L L.J. 441, 451 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Defenses to InternationalAntitrust].
86. See Sklaver, Sovereign Imnunity in the United States: An Analysis of S.566, 8 INT'L
LAW. 408, 410 (1974).
87. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 357.
88. See von Mehren, supra note 85, at 36-37; Defenses to InternationalAntitrust, supra
note 85, at 451.
89. Tate Letter, supra note 77. The rationale behind this narrowing of the foreign
sovereign immunity policy was explained as follows:

1984]

FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS

adopted the "restrictive" 90 theory of sovereign immunity, which
was becoming the prevailing rule of international law. 9' Under this
theory, a distinction was drawn between public acts (jure imperii)
and private acts (jure gestionis) of a state. 92 Immunity was granted
only in cases involving disputes arising from public acts of a sovereign.1 3 Commercial activities were considered private, and there-

[T]he Department feels that the widespread and increasing practice on the part of
governments of engaging in commercial activities makes necessary a practice which
will enable persons doing business with them to have their rights determined in the
courts. For these reasons it will hereafter be the Department's policy to follow the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign
governments for a grant of sovereign immunity.
Id. at 985.
90. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605.
Under this principle, the immunity of a foreign state is "restricted" to suits involving
a foreign state's public acts (jure imperii) and does not extend to suits based on its
commercial or private acts Gure gestionis). This principle was adopted by the
Department of State in 1952 and has been followed by the courts and by the
executive branch ever since. Moreover, it is regularly applied against the United
States in suits against the United States government in foreign courts.
Id. See infra notes 91-94.
91. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605. In his letter to the Acting Attorney General,
Tate pointed out that the Netherlands, Sweden, Argentina, Belgium, Italy, Egypt, Switzerland, France, Austria, Greece, Romania, Peru and Denmark either followed the restrictive
theory in 1952 or had indicated an intention to follow it. Furthermore, Brazil, Chile,
Estonia, Germany, Hungary, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and the
United States had, by treaty or through practice, retreated from the absolute theory by
denying immunity with regard to government owned or public operated merchant vessels.
Tate Letter, supra note 77, at 984-85. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 72 reporters' note 1.
See also von Mehren, supra note 85, at 38-39:
Prior to the passage of the Immunities Act in October 1976, all of the important
trading and industrial countries of the Western world, with the sole exception of the
United Kingdom, had adopted some form or other of the restrictive doctrine of
foreign sovereign immunity. This is confirmed by the decisions of many national
courts. Moreover, the restrictive doctrine had been incorporated in a number of
important international conventions, for instance the European Convention on
State Immunity, the Brussels Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules
relating to the Immunity of State-Owned Vessels, and the Treaty of Peace with
Germany.
Id. at 38.
92. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605. See supra note 90. For a discussion of the
importance of these distinctions in practice, see Lowenfeld, Claims Against Foreign StatesA ProposalforReform of United States Law, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 901, 906-07 (1969).
93. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605. Public or political acts are generally limited to
five categories:
(1) Internal administrative acts, such as expulsion of an alien.
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fore, the sovereign immunity defense was unavailable in actions
94
involving commercial disputes.
Where the sovereign immunity defense was raised in arbitration enforcement actions arising from commercial disputes, United
States courts sustained jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign by
fashioning a two-tier analysis.9 5 The sovereign immunity defense
was rejected under the restrictive theory, and personal jurisdiction
7
96
over the sovereign was held proper on the consent theory.
The consent theory was drawn from a long line of cases which
held that a party's selection of a forum for arbitration constitutes
consent to jurisdiction there. 8 The courts in the arbitration enforce-

(2) Legislative acts, such as nationalization.
(3) Acts concerning the armed forces.
(4) Acts concerning diplomatic activity.
(5) Public loans.
Victory Transp., Inc. v. ComisariA Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transp., 336 F.2d 354, 360
(2d Cir. 1964).
94. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605. See supra note 90 ("immunity does not extend
to suits based on its private or commercial acts"). See also Tate Letter, supra note 77.
95. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103, 110 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transp., Inc. v. ComisariA Gen. de Abastecimientos y
Trans., 336 F.2d 354, 362 (2d Cir. 1964); Pan Am. Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam,
296 F. Supp. 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See infra text accompanying notes 103-23.
96. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 363. The court held: "By agreeing to arbitrate in New
York, where the United States Arbitration Act makes such agreements specifically enforceable, the Comisarid General must be deemed to have consented to the jursidiction of the
court that could compel the arbitration proceeding in New York." Id. See infra note 117.
97. "Parties may agree in advance to submit their controversy to a given forum, in
which case the forum is the consent jurisdiction." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 277 (5th'ed.
1979). In 1964, the United States Supreme Court approved the concept of consent jurisdiction
in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). "[I]t is settled, as
the courts below recognized, that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the
jurisdiction of a given court." Id. So long as "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice" are not offended, a court has power to assert personal jurisdiction over a defendant
who has agreed in advance to confer such power upon the court. National Equip. Rental,
Ltd. v. Dec-Wood Corp., 51 Misc. 2d 999, 274 N.Y.S.2d 280 (App. Term 1966), quoting
International Shoe Co. v.Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See 2 J.MooRE, J. D. LuCAS, H.
FINK & C. THOMPSON, MooREs'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 4.25[8] (2d ed. 1948) [hereinafter cited
as J. MOORE].
98. See, e.g., Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petro. Corp. of Pan., 284
F.2d 419, 421 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 949 (1963); Farr & Co. v. The S.S. Punta
Alice, 144 F. Supp. 839 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), af'd sub nom. Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental
de Navegaci6n de Cuba, 243 F.2d 342, 346 (2d Cir. 1957); S.M. Wolff Co. v. Tulkoff, 9
N.Y.2d 356, 362, 174 N.E.2d 478 (1961); Gantt v. Felipe Y. Carlos Hurtado & Cia., 297
N.Y. 433, 439, 79 N.E.2d 815, cert. denied, 335 U.S. 843 (1948); Bradford Woolen Corp. v.
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ment actions relied specifically on two previous cases, Orion Shipping & Trading Co. v. Eastern States Petroleum Corp. of Panama,"
and Farr & Co. v. Cia. Intercontinental de Navegaci6n.0 0 Both
involved actions to compel arbitration pursuant to the Arbitration
Act. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that an
agreement to submit disputes to arbitration in New York constituted consent to jurisdiction in New York.'' The courts reasoned
that by consenting to arbitrate in New York, the sovereign respondents had also consented to the New York courts' jurisdiction for
02
purposes of enforcement under the Arbitration Act.1
The arbitration enforcement action in which the court first
analyzed the sovereign immunity defense under the restrictive theory and invoked this two-tier analysis, 0 3 was Victory Transport,
Inc. v. Comisarfa General. 04 This was an action to compel arbitration of a dispute under a charter party'0 5 for the transport of wheat
purchased by the Comisaria General of Spain. 0 6 The Spanish Gen-

Freedman, 189 Misc. 242, 244, 71 N.Y.S.2d 257 (Sup. Ct. 1947). See Kahale, Arbitration and
Choice-of-Law Clauses as Waivers of JurisdictionalImmunity, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL.
29, 40 (1981).
99. 284 F.2d at 419 (appeal from an order compelling the parties to proceed to arbitration over respondent's repudiation of a contract of affreightment). The court of appeals
vacated the stay of arbitration proceedings and affirmed the district court order compelling
arbitration. Id.
100. 243 F.2d at 342. (appeal from an order compelling the parties to arbitration). The
court of appeals affirmed, holding that the agreement to arbitrate in New York and service of
process by registered mail satisfied personal jurisdictional requirements. Id.
101. Orion, 284 F.2d at 421; Farr, 243 F.2d at 346.
102. Orion, 284 F.2d at 421; Farr, 243 F.2d at 346. These holdings rested on the fact
that the forum stipulated was New York where the Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982),
makes such agreements specifically enforceable. Orion, 284 F.2d at 421; Farr, 243 F.2d at
346. The legislative history on the Arbitration Act states: "The bill declares that such
agreements shall be recognized and enforced by the courts of the United States. The remedy is
founded also upon the Federal control over interstate commerce and over admiralty." H.R.
REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1924).
103. Id. See infra note 117. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit explained that
a sovereign's amenability to suit does not bear on the issue of sovereignty. Petrol Shipping
Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
104. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
105. "The term 'charter party,' often shortened to 'charter,' designates the document in
which are set forth the arrangements and contractual engagements entered into when one
person (the 'charterer') takes over the use of the whole of a ship belonging to another (the
'owner')." C. GILMORE & C. BLACK, Jn., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 4-1 (1975).
106. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 356. The charter party provided for a voyage charter
by appellant, Comisaria General of the S.S. Hudson, from owner-appellee, Victory Trans-
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07
eral Counsel argued that as an arm of the Spanish Government,1
08
the Comisaria General could not be sued without its consent.1
Relying on the restrictive theory, the court rejected the sovereign
immunity defense stating that the underlying business transaction,
had "all the earmarks of a typical commercial transaction.' '0 9 In a
separate jurisdictional analysis, the court held that the Comisaria
General had consented to the jurisdiction of the court by agreeing
to arbitrate in New York. 0 The court concluded that "[i]mplicit in
the agreement to arbitrate is consent to enforcement of that agree-

ment."'

The Victory Transport analysis was reflected in Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece.1 2 This was an action to compel
arbitration" 3 where the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

port, to transport a cargo of surplus wheat purchased pursuant to the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736(n) (1982), from Mobile, Alabama to
one or two safe Spanish ports. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 356. The ship sustained hull
damage while discharging its cargo in Spanish ports allegedly unsafe for a ship of the
Hudson's size for which the owner claimed damages. Id. The charter contained the New York
Produce Exchange Arbitration Clause, id., from the New York Produce Exchange Charter,
one of the more commonly used charter party forms. Domke, supra note 3, at 617. The clause
states:
Should any dispute arise between Owners and the Charterers, the matter in dispute
shall be referred to three persons at New York, one to be appointed by each of the
parties hereto, and the third by the two so chosen; their decision, or that of any two
of them, shall be final and for the purpose of enforcing any award this agreement
may be made a rule of the Court. The arbitrators shall be commercial men ....
336 F.2d at 356 n.2 (quoting New York Produce Exchange Charter, reprinted in TIME
CHARTERS, supra note 31, at 489).
107. Appellant, Comisaria General, was a branch of the Spanish Ministry of Commerce. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 356.
108. Id.at 357.
109. Id.at 360. These "earmarks" included:
1) the fact that the charter party was executed by the head of appellant's commercial
division;
2) the wheat was consigned to and shipped by a private commercial concern;
3) the inclusion of the arbitration clause.
4) the purchasing had been conducted through private channels of trade; and
5) that the contract was for maritime transport-an area traditionally regarded as commercial.
Id.at 360-61.
110. Id.at 363.
111. Id.at 364.
112. 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966).
113. Petitioner-appellee, Petrol Shipping, brought suit under section 4 of the United
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1982), seeking an order compelling respondent-appellant, Kingdom of Greece, proceed to arbitration. 360 F.2d at 106.
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rejected the Kingdom of Greece's defenses of lack of jurisdiction
and sovereign immunity." 4 The dispute concerned damage sustained by petitioner-appellee's ship while under charter to appellant for the transportation of grain.1 5 The charter party contained
a clause providing for arbitration of disputes in New York. 11 The
court, citing Victory Transport, held that the agreement to arbitrate constituted consent to jurisdiction. 117 The court then rejected
the sovereign immunity defense under the restrictive theory analysis
because the acts on which suit was brought constituted private
8
transactions."
Pan American Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam" 9 was
another action to compel arbitration in which the sovereign immunity defense was asserted. The claim involved a breach of a commercial contract for the transportation of cement. 12 0 The court
rejected respondent's assertion of sovereign immunity because of
the intrinsically commercial nature of the dispute.' 2' Invoking the

114. Petrol Shipping, 360 F.2d at 109-10.
115. Id. at 105. As in Victory Transport, 336 F.2d at 354, the charter party was for
transportation of surplus wheat purchased under the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736(n) (1982), by appellant from the United States
government. Id.
116. Petrol Shipping, 360 F.2d at 105. The Petrol Shipping charter, like the Victory
Transport charter, contained the New York Produce Exchange Arbitration Clause. It generally provides for arbitration of all disputes to be held in New York by three commercial men
to be chosen by the parties. Id. See supra note 106 (setting forth the language of the New York
Produce Exchange Arbitration Clause).
117. Petrol Shipping, 360 F.2d at 107. In its discussion, the court emphasized the
distinction between the personal jurisdiction and sovereign immunity questions. It stated:
The fact that one party is a branch of a foreign sovereign does not affect the
conclusion that by entering into an arbitration agreement containing a submission
such as here, the sovereign becomes amenable to suit. The question of immunity
does not bear on the question of amenability, or personal jurisdiction. What Farr
and Orion compel is that the Kingdom be treated as if it is physically present.
Id.
118. Id. at 110. The basis for this holding was two-fold: 1) the underlying transaction
was identical to that in Victory Transport in that it was under the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1736(n), and the voyage charter contained the same arbitration clause; 2) there was in evidence a letter from the State Department to appellant's representative rejecting the Kingdom's claim of sovereign immunity on
the ground that the acts on which the suit was brought were private. 360 F.2d at 110.
119. 296 F. Supp. 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
120. Id. at 362.
121. Id. at 364. The Republic of Vietnam argued that it was entitled to immunity
because the role it played in the transaction was that of a governmental supervisor over the
expenditure of foreign exchange which was political or sovereign in nature. Id. at 363. The
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Victory Transport analysis, the court held that under the restrictive
theory the breach of contract constituted a private act, not one of
such a nature "that the interests of private litigants must be sacrificed to the interest of international comity."'' 22 The jurisdictional
defense was not raised by respondent and, therefore, personal juris2 3
diction was assumed by the court.
Two long-standing principles were relied on in these cases: 1)
that a sovereign should not be immune from suits arising from its
commercial or private activities, 12 4 and 2) an agreement to arbitrate
in a forum is consent to jurisdiction in that forum. 125 By invoking
both the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity and the consent
theory of jurisdiction, the courts sustained arbitration enforcement
actions against foreign sovereigns. 2
B.
1.

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
Codification of the Restrictive Theory

With the enactment of the FSIA, Congress attempted to preserve the restrictive and consent theories by incorporating them into
statutory exceptions.1 27 Under the FSIA,128 immunity from jurisdiccourt found, however, that Vietnam actively participated in the transaction based on the
following factors: Vietnam's selection of the winning bidder for the contract; its negotiations
relating to the Fixture Note; its modification of delivery dates; its role as payee of the
performance bond; and, its involvement in negotiations after the alleged breach. Id. at 364.
122. Id. at 363.
123. Pan Am. Tankers Corp. v. Republic of Vietnam, 291 F. Supp. 49, 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1968). This was the original suit to compel arbitration where the court reserved its decision
pending further submission of papers on the sovereign immunity issue. See id. at 53. Here also
the court emphasized the separateness of the jurisdiction and sovereign immunity issues. The
court stated:
[T]echnically speaking, sovereign immunity is not a jurisdictional defect but rather
a substantive defense like incapacity or incompetency. However, The Republic of
Vietnam, in its special appearance, has not raised the question of lack of personal
jurisdiction, though there are some inferences that such a position might be taken in
the maritime attachment action. Thus, for purposes of disposition of this issue,
personal jurisdiction is assumed.
Id. at 52.
124. House REPORT, supra note 3, at 6607; RESTATEMENT, supra note 3, § 72 reporters'
note 1; see supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
125. DRAFT RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 456 (2)(b); see id. comment c. See also supra
notes 98-102 and accompanying text (case law development on issue of agreements to
arbitrate in New York as consent to jurisdiction).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 103-23.
127. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605 (purpose of the FSIA is to codify the socalled restrictive theory); id. at 6617 (implicit waivers are found where a foreign state has
agreed to arbitration in another country); infra notes 136-42 and accompanying text.
4
2
128. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)( )-( ), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976).
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tion of United States courts is generally granted to foreign states
unless the suit falls under an express exception. 2 9 In enacting the
FSIA, Congress' intent was to codify the restrictive theory. 30 In
addition, the FSIA provided for personal jurisdiction, thereby elim3
inating the need for the two-tier analysis of Victory Transport.1'

129. These exceptions to sovereign immunity under the FSIA are codified at 28 U.S.C.
1605-1607 (1976). In brief, section 1605 provides that a foreign state is not immune from
the jurisdiction of United States courts in any case where: 1) the state has waived its
immunity; 2) the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in or having a direct
effect in the United States; 3) rights in property taken in violation of international law are in
issue and that property is present in the United States or owned by a state engaged in
commercial activity in the United States; 4) rights in property in the United States acquired
by gift or immovable property present in the United States are in issue; 5) damages are sought
against a foreign state for personal injury or death occurring in the United States; and 6) a
suit in admiralty is brought to enforce a maritime lien against a vessel or cargo of a foreign
state. 28 U.S.C. § 1605. Section 1607 extends these exceptions to counterclaims. 28 U.S.C. §
1607. Section 1606 covers the extent of a foreign state's liability in suits falling under sections
1605 and 1607. 28 U.S.C. § 1606.
130. See HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6605. Another purpose of the FSIA is to
transfer the role of determining the immunity question from the executive branch to the
judicial branch. Id. at 6606. Sovereign immunity assertions were an area traditionally
handled by the Department of State which would make formal recommendations to the
courts. These recommendations were generally considered binding. Republic of Mex. v.
Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 35 (1945) ("It is therefore not for the courts to deny an immunity
which our government has seen fit to allow, or to allow an immunity on new grounds which
the government has not seen fit to recognize."). But cf. Ocean Transp. Co. v. Republic of
Ivory Coast, 269 F. Supp. 703, 705 (E.D. La. 1967). ("While I may not be bound by the State
Department's finding that the contractual transaction involved in the case was private rather
than public, it is highly persuasive and the authorities dictate that it must be given great
weight.") This transfer of power to the courts was effected to free the executive branch from
diplomatic pressures by foreign governments and to insure that the immunity question would
be decided on purely legal grounds. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6606. See Verlinden
B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds,
647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
131. 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). This section states, in pertinent part:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to
amount in controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined
in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-1607
of this title or under any applicable international agreement.
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for
relief over which the district courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) where
service has been made under section 1608 of this title.
Id. See Victory Transport v. Commiserii Gen., 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
381 U.S. 934 (1965).

§§
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Section 1330(a) provides that United States courts shall have
original subject matter jurisdiction to hear any claim involving a
foreign sovereign not entitled to immunity under either the statute
or any other international agreement.132 Section 1330(b) provides
for personal jurisdiction in cases within subsection (a) where service
of process has been effected in accordance with section 1608.133
Qualifying under one of the FSIA exceptions satisfies both subject
matter and personal jurisdiction and eliminates the need for the
separate analyses used in the pre-FSIA arbitration enforcement
cases. 134 With the merging of these two analyses, the availability of
the sovereign immunity defense is now considered a jurisdictional
question. 135

132. Id.
133. 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). See 28 U.S.C. § 1330(b). The House Report stated:
"[T]his bill would for the first time in U.S. law, provide a statutory procedure for making
service upon, and obtaining in personam jurisdiction over, a foreign state. This would render
unnecessary the practice of seizing and attaching the property of a foreign government for the
purpose of obtaining jurisdiction." HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6606.
134. See, e.g., Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 360 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 931 (1966); Victory Transp., 336 F.2d 354; Pan Am. Tankers Corp. v.
Republic of Vietnam, 291 F. Supp 49, 296 F. Supp 361 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The Supreme Court
of the United States addressed this issue in Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. 1962, stating: "Under the
Act, . . . both statutory subject matter jurisdiction . . . and personal jurisdiction turn on
application of the substantive provisions of the Act . . . . Thus, if none of the exceptions to
sovereign immunity set forth in the Act applies, the District Court lacks both statutory subject
matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction." Id. at 1697 n.5.
135. See Kahale, supra note 98, at 30-33.
In considering any of the immunity exceptions of section 1605, it is essential to bear
in mind the statutory framework integrating the immunity and jurisdictional issues,
especially since this feature of the FSIA contrasts sharply with prior law. Unlike the
law before the FSIA, a denial of immunity plus service of process now equals in
personam jurisdiction. It is no longer possible to consider the immunity issue in a
vacuum, divorced from its jurisdictional ramifications.
Id. at 32. Controversy has arisen, however, with regard to whether the jurisdictional requirements are sufficiently satisfied under section 1330 in cases falling under the commercial
activity exception. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit discussed this question in
depth in the context of constitutional due process analysis in Texas Trading & Milling Corp.
v. Federal Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981). This was an action for breach of
contract and related letters of credit arising from transactions with the government of Nigeria
for the purchase and sale of cement. Id. at 302. Regardless of the provisions of section 1330,
the court maintained a two-step analysis to determine subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See id. at 312. It held that the effect of the commercial activity was sufficiently "direct"
because the money from the contracts was to be collected in the United States and because the
beneficiaries of the contracts were American. Id. Thus, subject matter jurisdiction existed
under the provisions of the FSIA, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1605(a)(2) (1976). Texas Trading,
647 F.2d at 313. In addition, the court scrutinized the extent of defendant's contacts with the
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Congress incorporated modified versions of both the restrictive
and consent theories into the FSIA exceptions.1 36 A narrower version of the restrictive theory is clearly codified at section
1605(a)(2),' 137 which bars the sovereign immunity defense in cases
involving commercial activities of a foreign state which either have
been carried on or have a direct effect in the United States.138 The
consent theory emerges in section 1605(a)(1)13 9 which provides that
a foreign state is not immune from United States jurisdiction in any
case where "the foreign state has waived its immunity either explicitly or by implication."' l4 0 Congressional intent to codify the consent
theory in this section is reflected in the House Report, which states
that "the courts have found such waiver in cases where a foreign
state has agreed to arbitrationin another country or where a for-

United States for a separate finding of personal jurisdiction under the "minimum contacts"
standard established by the Supreme Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 313-15 (1945); Texas Trading, 647 F.2d at 314-15. See also Kane, Suing Foreign
Sovereigns: A ProceduralCompass, 34 STAN. L. REV. 385, 391-93 (1982). The author states:
The courts disagree as to whether section 1330 was intended to be the exclusive
source of jurisdiction for cases brought under the Act. Those finding exclusivity
argue that Congress meant the procedures set forth in the statute to govern in all
suits against foreign sovereigns and that it therefore is necessary to limit jurisdiction
to section 1330. Courts that have allowed suits outside section 1330 have declined to
preclude jurisdiction in the absence of a more explicit command from Congress ...
The decisions of courts on both sides of the issue reveal the confusion that arises from
the blend of substantive and procedural criteria in the Act.
Id. at 392.
136. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1)-(2) (1976). The restrictive theory now comes under
section 1605(a)(2), the commercial activity exception. The difference, however, is the requirement that the activity have a direct effect in the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
The consent theory has been incorporated into section 1605(a)(1), the waiver exception,
under which an agreement to arbitrate in a specific forum is deemed an implicit waiver of
sovereign immunity with respect to that forum. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
138. Id. This section provides:
(a) A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United
States or of the States in any case(2) in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity of
the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United States.
Id.
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976). See supra note 9.
140. Id.
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eign state has agreed that the law of a particular country should
govern a contract."1 4 1 Thus, what was previously considered to be
consent to jurisdiction became a waiver of sovereign immunity
42
under the FSIA.1
The impact of the codification of these theories is twofold.
First, many petitioners in arbitration enforcement actions are precluded from invoking section 1605 (a)(2), regardless of the commercial nature of the underlying transaction, because there is no "direct
effect" in the United States.1 43 This is particularly true in cases
where petitioners are seeking enforcement of foreign arbitration
agreements and awards. 144 Consequently, contrary to Congress'
intent, 145 petitioners in most arbitration enforcement actions are
precluded from invoking the commercial activity exception.1 46
141. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6617 (emphasis added). See DRAFT RESTATEMENT

supra note 3, § 456 comment d. The standards imposed by the waiver exception are parallel
to those imposed for jurisdiction in pre-FSIA arbitration enforcement actions. See supra notes
148-50 and accompanying text. The House Report explicitly refers to both arbitration clauses
that stipulate a forum and forum selection clauses; two offshoots of the consent theory as
espoused in National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964). See also
J. MOORE, supra note 96, § 4.25[8]. As a result, a waiver of sovereign immunity will be found
on the same facts and circumstances that would have sufficed for personal jurisdiction prior
to the FSIA.
142. From the legislative history of this section, it appears that Congress has adopted the
consent theory formula, previously used to determine in personam jurisdiction, and incorporated it into the waiver exception analysis of the FSIA. HousE REPORT, supra note 3, at 6617.
The waiver exception is the only exception to immunity under the FSIA which does not
require some contact between the suit and the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605, 1607 (1976).
"In the absence of a requirement of contacts with the United States, it seems clear that the
waiver provision is based on the theory of jurisdiction by consent." Kahale, supra note 98, at
34 n.20. See J. MOORE, supra note 96, § 4.25[2.-1].
143. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea, 505 F.
Supp. 141 (D.D.C. 1981), rev'd, 693 F.2d 1094 (5th Cir 1982), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 71
(1983) (dispute arose from a contract formed under the laws of Guinea between a Liechtenstein corporation and the Republic of Guinea and was referred to arbitration under the
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, a group affiliated with the
World Bank); LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980) (involved transaction between
Libyan company and Libyan government, carried on in Libya, which led to a dispute which
was arbitrated in Geneva, Switzerland); Ipitrade Int'l, S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 465
F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978) (dispute arose from transaction between French company and
Nigerian government to be performed in Nigeria and was arbitrated according to Swiss law
before the ICC).
144. See, e.g., LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. at 1175 (action to confirm Swiss arbitral
award); Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 824 (action to confirm a Swiss arbitral award rendered
before the ICC between foreign parties).
145. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
146. See, e.g., Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 826 (relying on the waiver exception successfully defeated sovereign immunity claim). Maritime Int'l, 505 F. Supp. at 141. Although the
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Second, under the waiver exception, what was previously construed as consent to jurisdiction1 4 r is now deemed a waiver of
foreign sovereign immunity.' 48 By invoking the jurisdictional con9
sent theory a party may successfully defeat sovereign immunity.14
The result is that petitioners in arbitration enforcement actions who
are now precluded from invoking the commercial activity exception
plead instead, under section 1605(a)(1), that the foreign sovereignrespondent has waived sovereign immunity by agreeing to arbitrate
50
in the underlying contract.'
2. The Waiver Exception
This transition in approach to the sovereign immunity defense,
compounded by the vague and ambiguous language of the waiver
exception,' 5 ' and its legislative history,' 52 has given rise to extensive
controversy.' 5 3 Courts initially interpreted the House Report literally, rejecting the sovereign immunity defense whenever parties
had merely agreed to arbitration in general, without specifying the
forum. 5 4 In recent years, however, the House Report has been
increasingly criticized as overbroad and ambiguous. 155 Courts, ex-

sovereign immunity defense was denied by the district court under the waiver exception, the
court of appeals reversed, holding that the agreement between the parties to submit future
disputes to arbitration conducted by the International Center for Settlement of Investment
Disputes was not a waiver since the agreement "did not foresee such a role for United States
courts." Maritime Int'l, 693 F.2d at 1104.
147. See supra note 98-102 and accompanying text.
148, See, e.g., LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. at 1175; Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 824. Both
courts relied specifically on the agreements to arbitrate in the underlying contract, holding
these agreements to be a consent to jurisdiction and therefore waiver of sovereign immunity.
LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp at 1178; Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp at 826.
149. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Maritime Int'l., 505 F. Supp. at 141; LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. at 1175;
Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 824.
151. 28 U.S.C. § 16 05(a)(1) (1976).
152. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
153. See infra text accompanying notes 170-211. See generally Kahale, supra note 98.
154. See, e.g., LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. at 1175 (agreement to arbitrate where either the
parties or arbitrators agreed); Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 824 (agreement to arbitrate before
the ICC in accordance with Swiss law).
155. Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1300. The district court referred to this statement as the
"cryptic language of the Congressional report ...."Id. It stated further: "The Congressional
history cited by the plaintiff is not dispositive of this issue, indeed, it is at most ambiguous."
Id. at 1301. In Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc., 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981), the
court stated: "The quoted passage from the House Report does not mandate a contrary
conclusion, as it is unclear whether, in referring to 'another country,' Congress intended to
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amining the pre-FSIA analysis,1 56 began requiring that the forum
be stipulated in the arbitration agreement. 5 7 As a result, a waiver
will be found only if the forum where the agreement or award is
sought to be enforced is stipulated in the arbitration clause. 58
IV. CASE LAW DEVELOPMENT OF THE
WAIVER EXCEPTION
A. Ipitrade International S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria
The first case in which this issue was raised was Ipitrade
InternationalS.A. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria.15 9 Plaintiff Ipitrade, a French company, brought suit in the District Court for the
District of Columbia to enforce a Swiss arbitral award against the
defendant, the Republic of Nigeria. 160 The underlying dispute arose
out of a written commercial contract for the purchase and sale of
cement. ' 6' Provision was made in that contract for resolution of all
disputes to be in accordance with Swiss law and submitted to
arbitration before the International Chamber of Commerce, Paris,
France (ICC). 16 2 Defendant first asserted the sovereign immunity

include a third-party country." Id. at 1285. Kahale, supra note 98, at 35, 38. See Note,
Maritime International Nominees Establishment v. Republic of Guinea: Effect on U.S.
Jurisdictionof an Agreement by a Foreign Sovereign to Arbitrate before the International
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes, 16 CEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 451,
464 (1982).
156. See Maritime Int'l. Nominees Estab. v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1982); Verlinden, 488 F. Supp. at 1284.
157. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text. The Draft Restatement states:
d. Waiver impliedfrom agreement to arbitrate.Subsection (2)(b) is stated as a rule
of United States law, but with some differences in detail appears to be the emerging
international law as well. A question still open under international law is whether
the waiver implied from an agreement to arbitrate is limited to jurisdiction at the
place chosen as the site of the arbitrator, or is world-wide.
DRAFr RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 456 comment d.
158. See generally Kahale supra, note 98.
159. 465 F. Supp. 824 (D.D.C. 1978).
160. Petitioner, Ipitrade International, filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award
under the provisions of the Convention, supra note 5. Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 826.
161. Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 826.
162. Id. The clause stated that disputes were to be submitted to the ICC, in accordance
with its rules. Memorandum of Points and Authorities of Ipitrade International, S.A. in
Support of Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award at 2, Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 824. This
did not necessarily mean that the arbitration was to take place in Paris. The rules provide
that if the parties do not agree on a place of arbitration it will be fixed by the ICC. Therefore,
the choice of forum was left open. ICC RULES, art. 12.
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defense in the arbitration proceeding before the ICC,163 but the
defense was rejected by the arbitrator, who found that under Swiss
law the Republic of Nigeria was bound by "the obligations it voluntarily entered into.'

6

4

In the action to enforce the award in the

district court, the Republic of Nigeria again asserted the sovereign
immunity defense.' 65 The district court held that defendant had
implicitly waived sovereign immunity. 6 6 This holding apparently
rested on the above mentioned language of the House Report, in
conjunction with the fact that the dispute fell under the Convention, as France, Nigeria and the United States were all signatories. 167 The court's line of reasoning, however, is difficult to discern,
and provides little guidance on the issue. 16 8 Consequently, courts
6

have interpreted Ipitrade inconsistently.1

B. Subsequent Treatment of Ipitrade
In Ipitrade, the court concluded:
No judgment by default shall be entered by a federal district
court against a foreign state unless the claimant establishes his
right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the Court. 28 U.S.C. §
1608(e). In the instant case, Petitioner is entitled to such relief
because the provisions of the Convention on the Recognition and

163. Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 826. Relying on this defense, respondent refused to
participate in the arbitration proceeding. Id.
164. Id. The arbitrator proceeded with the arbitration and on April 25, 1978, rendered
an award that under Swiss law was final and binding on the respondent. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. The court stated:
The legislative history of this section expressly states that an agreement to arbitrate
or to submit to the laws of another country constitutes an implicit waiver. Consequently, Respondent's agreement to adjudicate all disputes arising under the contract in accordance with Swiss law and by arbitration under International Chamber
of Commerce Rules constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity under the Act. This
waiver cannot be revoked by a unilaterial withdrawal.
Id. (citation omitted). With respect to the Convention, the court stated: "Article V of the
Convention specifies the only grounds on which recognition and enforcement of a foreign
arbitration award may be refused. None of the enumerated grounds exist in the instant case."
Id. (citations omitted). The court concluded: "Petitioner is entitled to ... relief because the
provisions of the [Convention] and of The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act are satisfied."
Id. at 827.
168. See infra note 172 and accompanying text.
169. See inJra text accompanying notes 174-205.
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Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and of the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act are satisfied. 170.

Numerous speculative comments have been made on the portent of this holding.1 71 For example, one commentator states:
The court appeared to attach some significiance to the fact that
Nigeria was a party to the U.N. Convention . . . although it is
not clear whether its reference to this fact was in connection
with the jurisdiction issue or the merits, i.e., the recognition of
the award. . . . It is therefore conceivable that Nigeria's adherence to the U.N. Convention was seen as having some jurisdictional significance. However, any such relevance was neither
72
explained by the court nor argued by counsel.

This passage is representative of the confusion in various
courts' analyses of the foreign sovereign immunity defense. 173 For
example, in Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 74 a suit for
anticipatory breach of an irrevocable documentary letter of
credit, 7 respondent Nigeria asserted the sovereign immunity defense. 176 The district court dismissed the case for lack of in personam jurisdiction, holding that the action did not fall under any of
the FSIA exceptions.177 Plaintiff argued that Nigeria had waived its

170. Ipitrade Int'l S.A. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 465 F. Supp. 824, 827 (D.D.C.
1978).
171. See, e.g., Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488 F. Supp. 1284, 1300
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962
(1983).
172. Kahale, supra note 98, at 46-47 n.72 (citations omitted).
173. See infra text accompanying notes 174-205.
174. 488 F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 320 (2d Cir.
1981), rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983).
175. 488 F. Supp. at 1287. The dispute in Verlinden arose from the same series of
cement contracts underlying the Ipitrade dispute which Nigeria entered into in 1975. Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. at 824. There was a total of 109 contracts involving 68 suppliers entered
into by the Nigerian Ministry of Defense as part of a program to purchase up to 18 million
metric tons of cement. When the Nigerian ports became severely congested due to the
multitude of ships delivering the cement, the Nigerian Government ordered an embargo in
order to allow for delivery of vital consumer goods. See Verlinden, 103 S. Ct. at 1966 n.2.
Other suits arising from these contracts include: Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal
Republic of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Decor by
Nikkei Int'l, Inc. v. Federal Republic of Nig., 497 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
176. 488 F. Supp. at 1288.
177. 488 F. Supp. at 1302. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed but on
different grounds; the FSIA exceeded the scope of article III of the Constitution because
neither the diversity clause nor the "arising under" clause of article III was broad enough to
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immunity by agreeing to arbitrate in the underlying cement contract. 78 The court rejected plaintiffs argument because the suit
was over a letter of credit, not the cement contract which contained
the arbitration agreement.179 More importantly, the Verlinden
court distinguished Ipitrade because that was an action to enforce
an arbitration award whereas Verlinden was a suit for breach of a
letter of credit. 80 This distinction was premised on the idea that
Ipitrade drew its subject matter jurisdiction from the Convention. 8' The court stated: "The treaty explicitly federalizes all such
enforcement actions and sharply constricts the scope of review of
arbitral awards. By signing the treaty Nigeria had explicitly waived
'1 82
its objection to such enforcement actions.'
The Verlinden court's analysis is echoed in Ohntrup v. Firearms Center Inc.,183 in which the court held that sovereign immunity had not been waived.184 The court distinguished Ipitrade as an
action to enforce an award with jurisdiction provided by the Convention. 18 5 In Ohntrup, the claim was for breach of warranties,
product liability and negligence. The plaintiff-buyer was injured
when a gun, purchased from defendant, malfunctioned. 88 Defend-

confer subject matter jurisdiction over actions by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defendants. 647 F.2d at 328. It concluded, therefore, that Congress lacked the power to confer
jurisdiction over this case. Id. at 330. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
that the grant of jurisdiction in the FSIA is consistent with the Constitution. 103 S. Ct. at
1973. Thus, the case was remanded to the court of appeals for examination of the jurisdictional question under the FSIA to determine whether it falls under any of the enumerated
exceptions. Id.
178. 488 F. Supp. at 1300.
179. Id. at 1301. The court stated:
Plaintiff seeks to blur the distinctions between two separate obligations binding
between different parties. The cement contract was signed by Nigeria's Minister of
Defense on behalf of the Nigerian government; Central Bank is not a party to that
agreement, which binds only Verlinden and Nigeria. . .. This is not a hypertechnical distinction. The contract indicates that to whatever extent, if at all, Nigeria
waived its immunity by reason of the arbitration provision, it did so only with
respect to the contract, not the credit.
Id.
180. Id. at 1300 n.84.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. 516 F. Supp. 1281 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
184. Id. at 1285.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1283.
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ant-seller impleaded the manufacturer, a Turkish corporation
18 7
whose stock was wholly owned by the Turkish government.
Plaintiffs then amended their complaint to include claims against
the manufacturer. 8 8 Relying on Ipitrade, plaintiffs attempted to
establish that a forum selection clause in the underlying sales agreement referring all disputes to the Paris International Court constituted a waiver of sovereign immunity. 89 The court disagreed with
this position holding that a waiver of immunity as to one jurisdiction cannot be interpreted as a general waiver. 9 0 In addition, the
waiver in the sales contract did not encompass the third party
dispute at issue.' 9' The Ohntrup court distinguished Ipitradeon the
ground that in that case arbitration was the subject of the dispute
and the arbitration clause had been specifically invoked. 92 Citing
Verlinden, the Ohntrup court pointed out that jurisdiction over the
enforcement action in Ipitrade was provided by the Convention
since all parties were signatories.19 3 Because Ohntrup was not an
arbitration enforcement action and did not fall under the Convention, there was no basis for a finding that sovereign immunity had
9 4
been waived.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 1284. The clause read: "Any dispute between the parties, arising in connection with the application of the agreement, will be handled and solved by [the] Paris
International Court." Id.
190. Id. at 1285. The court stated:
While it is reasonable to conclude that an agreement by a foreign country to either
arbitrate disputes in or be governed by the laws of the United States constitutes an
implicit waiver by that state of the defense of sovereign immunity in the courts or
the United States, it is much more difficult to infer such a waiver from the agreement of a foreign state to submit itself, in the same manner, to the jurisdiction of a
state other than the United States.
Id.
191. Id.
192. Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1285. The fact that Ipitradewas an action to confirm an
arbitration award, Ipitrade, 465 F. Supp. 825, placed it under the jurisdiction of the
Convention. Id. The arbitration clause had been invoked and was within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court under the Convention thereby placing it within the ambit of the
waiver exception. Id. The Ohntrup dispute, however, involving negligence and products
liability, was related to arbitration merely because of the existence of the clause. It was never
actually invoked nor relied on for any purpose other than to defeat sovereign immunity under
the waiver exception. Id.
193. Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1285 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 488
F. Supp. 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 647 F.2d 329 (2d Cir. 1981), rev'd,
103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983)).
194. Ohntrup, 516 F. Supp. at 1285.
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Another case which relied upon Ipitrade was LIAMCO' 95
an action to enforce a Swiss arbitral award under the Convention.
The District Court for the District of Columbia held that the arbitration clause, which provided that "arbitration should take place
either where the parties agreed, or where the arbitrators might
agree,' 1°6 constituted consent by the parties to have it arbitrated in

the United States and was, therefore, a waiver under section
1605(a)(1).1 97 The court made no mention of the applicability of the
Convention and apparently attached no significance to it either in
LIAMCO or in its earlier decision in Ipitrade.I9 The LIAMCO
court relied solely on the arbitration clause as the waiver, invoking
the reasoning of courts in cases where the Convention does not
apply. 199
In its brief on appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit
Court, the United States as amicus curiae2 0 0 placed great emphasis
on Libya's accession to the Convention in arguing that Libya had
waived sovereign immunity. 20 1 The United States argued the prevailing theory that an agreement to arbitrate in the United States is
a waiver of sovereign immunity. 202 Thus, Libya, in undertaking the
treaty commitment of the Convention, "manifestly agreed to a
clear procedure" 20 3 for determining the situs of arbitration which
could be any member state of the Convention, including the United
States.20 4 Having consented as such, the United States contended,

195. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
196. Id. at 1178.
197. Id. The case was dismissed, however, under the act of state doctrine. The court
held that the "subject matter of the dispute, nationalization of LIAMCO's assets, was an act
of state, and constituted 'subject matter not capable of settlement by arbitration under the
law of that country' under article V of the Convention." Id. (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. Id. "Although the United States was not named, consent to have a dispute arbitrated where the arbitrators might determine was certainly consent to have it arbitrated in
the United States." Id.
200. Brief for the United States as amicus curaie, LIAMCO, 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C.
1980), reprinted in 20 I.L.M. 161, 163 (1981) [hereinafter cited as United States Brief].
201. Id., reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 162-64.
202. Id., reprinted in 20 I.L.M. . at 162. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying
text.
203. United States Brief, supra note 200, reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 163.
204. Id., reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 162-63. The United States Government argued:
Section 1605(a)(1) must be applied by the courts not only where the arbitration
agreement explicity stipulates the United States as the situs of arbitration properly
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Libya could not avoid application of the Convention and enforce20 5
ment of the award in the United States.
A private settlement was reached between the parties in
LIAMCO.20 Nevertheless, the argument as set forth by the United
States in its brief presents the most coherent analysis of the issue. It
is comparable to the pre-FSIA jurisdictional analysis under the
consent theory used in cases falling under the Arbitration Act: by
agreeing to arbitrate where the Arbitration Act made such agreements enforceable, a sovereign consented to that jurisdiction in an
action to enforce it. 207 By ratifying the treaty which provides for
enforcement in signatory countries,2 08 a sovereign is consenting to
jurisdiction in those countries and thereby waiving its immunity
with respect to enforcement actions.209 The jurisdiction conferred
by the Convention places a suit in a separate category whereby
enforcement becomes virtually automatic 210 where signatory countries are involved.2 11 A sovereign's ratification of the Convention,
therefore, should be deemed consent to the enforcement mechanism
that it provides.
CONCLUSION
On accession to the Convention in 1970, the United States
chose to adopt both reservations available to signatory countries.
takes place in any state which is party to the New York Convention. This is so
because the United States has undertaken a treaty commitment in the Convention to
recognize and enforce in United States courts foreign arbitral awards made in the
territory of states who are members of the Convention.
Id., reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 162.
205. Id., reprinted in 20 I.L.M. at 163.
206. See Kahale, supra note 98, at 49 n.83. On motion by the amicus curiae parties, the
district court decision dismissing the case was vacated as moot, no opposition having been
made, on May 6, 1981. Id.
207. See supra notes 98-102 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 45-48.
209. If under the consent theory a sovereign is deemed to have consented to jurisdiction
by agreeing to arbitrate in the United States, it follows that agreement to enforcement under
the Convention which extends to the United States should also be construed as consent to
jurisdiction. See DaRAr RESTATEMENT, supra note 9, § 456 reporters' note 2. See supra notes
200-05 and accompanying text.
210. Convention, supra note 5. The grounds for resisting enforcement are narrow and
the scope of review granted the enforcing court is very limited, thereby making resistance to
enforcement difficult. See supra notes 49-71 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 72-80. The reciprocity reservation, for those countries who adopt
it, further limits the application of the Convention, to awards made in the territory of
another contracting state. See Convention, supra note 5, art. 1(3).
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One result of this is that the Convention applies only to arbitrations
involving commercial legal relationships. 212 From the inception of
the restrictive theory, parties to commercial disputes have been
precluded from asserting the sovereign immunity defense.2 1 3 The
second circuit, in Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisarid General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, upheld the restrictive theory as
"accommodat[ing] the interests of individuals doing business with
foreign governments in having their legal rights determined by the
courts" 2 14-an interest compatible with and reflecting the purpose
of the Convention. The subsequent enactment of the FSIA, which
was intended to codify the restrictive theory, should be construed to
promote this purpose, not frustrate it. Although suits under the
Convention may be precluded from invoking the commercial activity exception of the FSIA due to the direct effect clause, 21 5 the
waiver exception2 16 provides a viable alternative.
Case law under the waiver exception supports the view that an
agreement to arbitrate in the United States is an implied waiver of a
sovereign's immunity under the theory that implicit in these agreements is also agreement to their enforcement. This view is premised
on the pre-FSIA consent theory analysis that an agreement to arbitrate in a forum where the Arbitration Act has jurisdiction to
enforce that agreement constitutes consent to that jurisdiction for
such enforcement actions. It should follow that a country's ratification of a Convention which provides jurisdiction for enforcement
actions in signatory countries constitutes consent to jurisdiction in
those countries with respect to arbitration enforcement actions. A
country's accession to the Convention, conceived of, drafted and
implemented toward enforcement of arbitration agreements and
ensuing awards, should therefore preclude assertion of the sovereign immunity defense in enforcement actions under the Convention.
Tara A. O'Brien

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

See supra notes 72-77 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (1976).

